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ABSTRACT
Smart contracts are Turing-complete programs that execute on
the infrastructure of the blockchain, which often manage valuable
digital assets. Solidity is one of the most popular programming
languages for writing smart contracts on the Ethereum platform.
Like traditional programs, smart contracts may contain vulnerabili-
ties. Unlike traditional programs, smart contracts cannot be easily
patched once they are deployed. It is thus important that smart
contracts are tested thoroughly before deployment. In this work,
we present an adaptive fuzzer for smart contracts on the Ethereum
platform called sFuzz. Compared to existing Solidity fuzzers, sFuzz
combines the strategy in the AFL fuzzer and an efficient lightweight
multi-objective adaptive strategy targeting those hard-to-cover
branches. sFuzz has been applied to more than 4 thousand smart
contracts and the experimental results show that (1) sFuzz is ef-
ficient, e.g., two orders of magnitude faster than state-of-the-art
tools; (2) sFuzz is effective in achieving high code coverage and
discovering vulnerabilities; and (3) the different fuzzing strategies
in sFuzz complement each other.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, smart contracts [11, 28] are implemented as Turing-
complete programs that execute on the infrastructure of the block-
chain [33]. It provides a framework that potentially allows any
program (equivalently, contract) to be executed in an autonomous,
distributed, and trustedway. Smart contracts thus have the potential
to revolutionize many industries. Popular applications of smart
contracts include crowd fundraising, online gambling and so on.
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Ethereum [1, 31] is the first to introduce the functionality of smart
contracts. Based on the Ethereum platform, Solidity is the most
popular programming language for smart contracts [6].
Like traditional C or Java programs, smart contracts may contain
vulnerabilities. Unlike traditional programs, smart contracts cannot
be modified easily once they are deployed on the blockchain [23].
As a result, a vulnerability renders the smart contract forever vul-
nerable, which significantly magnifies the problem. In recent years,
there has been an increasing number of news reports on attacks
which exploit security vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts.
One particularly noticeable example is the DAO attack [12], i.e.,
an attacker stole more than 3.5 million Ether (which is equiva-
lent to about $45 million USD at the time) exploiting a vulnera-
bility in the DAO contract. To fix the vulnerability, a hard fork
was launched which was not only expensive but also caused much
controversy [12].
It is thus desirable to develop tools for validating smart contracts
to identify vulnerabilities, ideally before they are deployed. Among
the range of complementary techniques for validating smart con-
tracts, we focus on automatic testing of smart contracts in this work
as testing is often the least expensive and thus the most applicable.
To automatically test smart contracts, we must solve the following
three problems:
• the test automation problem (i.e., how to run test cases),
• the test generation problem (i.e., what to test),
• and the oracle problem (i.e., what are vulnerabilities).
In the literature, several approaches have been developed for auto-
matic testing smart contracts, each of which answers these three
problems in slightly differentways. For instance, ContractFuzzer [18]
builds a network with pre-deployed contracts and generates trans-
actions to run smart contracts, generates test cases based on a set
of predefined parameter values and targets a set of oracles specific
for smart contracts. Oyente [22] runs smart contracts symbolically
through symbolic execution, generates test cases for covering dif-
ferent program paths in single functions through constraint solving,
and supports multiple oracles to identify 4 kinds of vulnerabilities.
teEther [21] similarly applies symbolic execution to generate test
cases covering program paths, and focuses on oracles which are
related to financial transactions.
In this work, we propose a fully automatic testing engine for
smart contracts running on Ethereum called sFuzz. sFuzz is inspired
by AFL [7], a well-known fuzzer for C programs, i.e., sFuzz is a
feedback-guided fuzzing engine and is inexpensive to apply. sFuzz
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complements existing testing engines based on symbolic execution
like Oyente and teEther, as it is known that fuzzing and symbolic
execution are complementary [30, 32]. While AFL-based fuzzing
is often effective, it has its limitation as well, i.e., it is often ex-
pensive in covering branches guarded with strict conditions. To
tackle the problem, sFuzz integrates AFL-based fuzzing with an
efficient lightweight adaptive strategy for selecting seeds. Although
inspired by search-based software testing [16, 24], the latter distin-
guishes itself by having a lightweight objective function (designed
considering characteristics of Solidity programs) as well as a novel
multi-objective optimization strategy.
sFuzz is built based on Aleth [2] (i.e., an Ethereum VM written
in C++), has a system architecture similar to AFL, and is extensible
to different Ethereum VMs and oracles as well as fuzzing strate-
gies. sFuzz has been systematically applied to a set of more than
4 thousand smart contracts. The experimental results show that
sFuzz is on average more than two orders of magnitudes faster than
ContractFuzzer, covers more branches and reveals many more vul-
nerabilities. A comparison between sFuzz and Oyente shows that
they are complementary. Furthermore, experiments with prolonged
fuzzing time show that the adaptive strategy improves code cov-
erage. sFuzz is available online and has been adopted by multiple
companies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
illustrates how sFuzz works through examples. Section 3 presents
the details of the approach. Section 4 shows implementation details
of sFuzz. Section 5 reports evaluation results. Section 6 reviews
related work and concludes.
2 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, we show how sFuzz works step-by-step through
two illustrative examples. Note that Solidity source codes for both
examples are shown for simplicity. sFuzz requires only the EVM (i.e.,
Ethereum Virtual Machine) bytecode [1, 31] to fuzz smart contracts.
Given a smart contract, sFuzz automatically configures a block-
chain network, deploys the smart contract, and generates multiple
transactions each of which calls a function in the contract. The
transactions are then executed with an EVM enriched with a set
of oracles for identifying vulnerabilities. sFuzz monitors the execu-
tion of the transactions to collect certain feedback, e.g., whether a
certain branch has been covered and how far the branch is covered.
Whenever a vulnerability is revealed, the transactions and the net-
work configuration (i.e., a test case) are saved and reported to the
user later on. Otherwise, some of the test cases are selected as seeds
based on feedback collected during the transaction execution ac-
cording to certain seed selection criteria. Afterwards, the seeds are
mutated to generate the next generation of test cases. This process
repeats until a time out occurs.
In the following, we describe how sFuzz works using the contract
shown in Figure 1. The contract implements a simple quiz game.
The contract is based on contract opposite_дame1 with minor mod-
ification for simplicity. A quiz can be created by calling function
start_quiz_дame . The response is hashed and then saved in the
responseHash variable. The user then calls the try function with
their answer as the argument and pays a fee of 100 f inney (which
1address: 0x467532e79222670a2044c9b168bcbaa33b390ef5
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.20;
2 contract opposite_game {
3 string public question;
4 address questionSender;
5 bytes32 responseHash;
6
7 function Try(
8 string _response ) external payable {
9 if(responseHash == keccak256(_response) &&
10 msg.value == 100 finney) {
11 msg.sender.send(this.balance); } }
12
13 function start_quiz_game(
14 string _question , string _answer) public payable {
15 if(responseHash ==0x0) {
16 responseHash = keccak256(_answer);
17 question = _question;
18 questionSender = msg.sender; } }
19
20 function () public payable {} }
Figure 1: An example with single objective function
is a unit of the token) for each try. If the answer is correct, a reward
is sent to the user.
This contract suffers from a vulnerability known as Gasless Send
when line 11 is executed and a costly fallback function is called.
That is, when function send() at line 11 is executed, if the receiver is
a contract, its fallback function is executed automatically. Because
function send() only forwards 2300 units of gas (i.e., price to pay
for executing the function), an out-of-gas exception is thrown if the
fallback function is costly (e.g., costs more than 2300 units of gas).
In this case, the send() function simply returns f alse and because
the returned value is not checked and handled accordingly, the
owners of the contract can keep the reward for themselves.
To expose this vulnerability, first a network is configured with
several addresses and associated balances. This contract is then
deployed at one of the addresses. In addition, an attacker con-
tract with a costly fallback function is deployed automatically. To
expose the vulnerability, a test case (i.e., a sequence of transac-
tions) with such a network configuration must first call function
start_quiz_дame and then functionTry with parameters such that
all 2 conditions in function Try at line 9 and 10 are satisfied. The
condition at line 9 is satisfied with a test case that sets all the pa-
rameters and contract variables to the default value of 0. Note that
responseHash is set to keccak256(_answer ) at line 16 and is com-
pared to keccak256(_response) at line 9. However, generating a test
case which satisfies the second condition by randomly generated
test values is highly unlikely. The variablemsд.value has a size of
32 bytes and thus we have only 12256 probability to generate the
value 100 (if we generate random values with a uniform distribu-
tion among all possible values). Existing fuzzing strategy in AFL
is ineffective in this case as well, i.e., AFL selects test cases that
cover new branches as seeds . Since all test cases generated through
mutation are unlikely to cover the then-branch at line 10, they are
equally ‘bad’ according to the AFL seed selection strategy.
sFuzz complements AFL’s seed selection strategy with an adap-
tive strategy that prioritizes the seeds according to a quantita-
tive measure (i.e., a distance) on how far a seed is from covering
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1 pragma solidity ^0.4.20;
2 contract multiple_objective_function {
3 function foo(int x) {
4 int y = x*x + 10;
5 if(y == 110) { ... }
6 if(y == 10010) { ... } } }
Figure 2: An example with multiple objective functions
any just-missed branch. For this example, the distance for cover-
ing the just-missed branch (i.e., the then-branch) is computed as:
|msд.value − 100| + 1, based on the value ofmsд.value when the
branch at line 10 is reached in the test case. Intuitively, the smaller
the distance is, the closer the test case is to cover the branch (i.e.,
with amsд.value closer to 100). In particular, whenmsд.value is
exactly 100, the distance value reaches the minimum value of 1.
Based on this measurement, sFuzz iteratively selects seeds which
gradually gets closer and closer to satisfying the condition at line
10. In our experiment, after 140 generations, sFuzz generates a test
case which covers the branch, and reveals the vulnerability.
The above example shows a simplistic situation where there is
only one just-missed branch. In general, there may be multiple
just-missed branches and thus sFuzz measures a distance for each
pair of test case and just-missed branch, i.e., how far is the branch
from being covered by the test case. Then for each just-missed
branch, sFuzz selects the test case with the minimum distance as
the seed . For instance, the contract in Figure 2 shows a function
which performs some basic arithmetic operations. There are two
different branches, i.e., the condition at line 5 for comparing y with
110 and the one at line 6 for comparing y with 10010. Assume that
both then-branches are yet to be covered. Given any test case, sFuzz
computes two distances, one for covering the first then-branch; and
the other for covering the second then-branch. Given a set of test
cases, sFuzz selects, for each of these two branches, a test case
which has minimum distance as seed, to generate further test cases.
After repeating the process multiple times, sFuzz generates two
test cases that cover the two then-branches. We remark that for
this example, due to the non-linear computation at line 4, approaches
based on symbolic execution like Oyente [22] and teEther [21] are
ineffective due to the limitation of underlying constraint solvers.
3 FUZZING SMART CONTRACTS
In this section, we define our problem and then present our ap-
proach in detail step-by-step.
3.1 Problem Definition
A smart contract S typically has a number of instance variables,
a constructor and multiple functions, some of which are public.
It can be equivalently viewed in the form of a control flow graph
(CFG) S = (N , i,E) where N is a finite set of control locations in
the program; i ∈ N is the initial control location, i.e., the start of
the contract; and E ⊆ N × C × N is a set of labeled edges, each
of which is of the form (n, c,n′) where c is either a condition (for
conditional branches like if-then-else or while-loops) or a command
(i.e., an assignment). Note that for simplicity, we define the smart
contract as one single graph rather than defining one graph for
each function and then connecting them through a call graph. A
node in the graph is branching if and only if it has multiple child
nodes and its outgoing edges are labeled with conditions. We refer
to an outgoing edge of a branching node as a branch.
Test cases. A test case for S is a pair (σ0, Σ) where σ0 is a configura-
tion of the blockchain network and Σ is a sequence of transactions
(i.e., function calls). The configuration σ0 contains all information
on the setup of the network which is relevant to the execution of
the smart contract. Formally, σ0 is a tuple (b, ts, SA, SB,v) where b
is the current block number, ts is the current block timestamp, SA
is a set of the addresses of the smart contracts (including the smart
contract under test as well as other invoked contracts), SB is a func-
tion which assigns an initial balance to each address and v is the
initial valuation of the persistent state. Σ = ⟨m0(−→p0),m1(−→p1), · · · ⟩
is a sequence of public function calls of the smart contract under
test, each of which has an optional sequence of concrete input
parameters −→pi . Note thatm0 must be a call of the constructor.
The task of fuzzing a smart contract is thus to generate a set of
test cases (a.k.a. test suite) according to certain testing criteria. The
execution of a test case t traverses through a path in the CFG S,
which visits a set of nodes and edges. For simplicity, we assume
that one test execution covers one unique path (i.e., there is no non-
determinism). Furthermore, a trace generated by t is a sequence
of pairs of the form ⟨(σ0,n0), (σ1,n1), · · · ⟩ where (n0,n1, · · · ) is the
sequence of nodes visited by t and σi is the configuration at the
time of visiting node ni for all i .
Code Coverage. Ideally, we aim to generate a test suite which re-
veals all vulnerabilities in the contract. However, as we do not
know where the vulnerabilities are, we must instead aim to achieve
something more measurable. In this work, our answer is to focus
on code coverage, in particular, branch coverage. We remark that
our approach can be extended to support different coverage at the
cost of additional code instrumentation. A branch in S is covered
by a test suite if and only if there is a test case t in the suite that
visits the edge at least once. The branch coverage of a test suite
is calculated as the percentage of the covered branches over the
total number of branches. Note that identifying the total number of
(feasible) branches statically in a smart contract is often infeasible
for two reasons. First, some branches might be infeasible (i.e., there
does not exist any test case that visits the branch) and knowing
whether a branch is feasible or not is a hard problem. Second, EVM
has a stack-based implementation which makes identifying all po-
tentially feasible branches hard (as we will explain in more detail in
Section 4). Our problem is thus reduced to generate a test suite which
maximizes the number of covered branches.
To achieve maximum code coverage, one way is to generate a
large test suite (e.g., through random test generation). However, in
practice, we often have limited resources (in terms of time or the
number of computer processes) and thus our problem is refined
as ‘to generate a test suite which maximizes the number of covered
branches as efficiently as possible’. Our solution to the problem is
feedback-guided adaptive fuzzing.
Fuzzing is one of themost popularmethods to create test cases [20].
A feedback-guided fuzzing system (a.k.a. fuzzer) takes a program
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Algorithm 1: The test generation algorithm
1 let suite be an empty test suite;
2 let seeds := initPopulation();
3 while not time out do
4 add tests in seeds which covers new branches into suite ;
5 let seeds := f itT oSurvive(seeds);
6 let seeds = crossoverMutation(seeds);
7 return suites ;
under test and an initial test suite as input, monitors the execution
of the test cases to obtain certain feedback, generates new test cases
based on the existing ones in certain ways and then repeats the
process until a stopping criteria is satisfied. We present details of
our feedback-guided adaptive fuzzing process in Section 3.2.
Oracles The remaining problem is then how to tell whether a test
case reveals a vulnerability. In this work, we adopt a set of oracles
from previous approaches [18, 22] including Gasless Send, Exception
Disorder, Timestamp Dependency, Block Number Dependency, Dan-
gerous DelegateCall, Reentrancy, Integer Overflow/Underflow, and
Freezing Ether. We refer the readers to Section 4 for details.
3.2 Feedback-Guided Adaptive Fuzzing
The general idea of feedback-guided fuzzing is to transform the test
generation problem into an optimization problem and use some
form of feedback as an objective function in solving the optimization
problem. Our fuzzing strategy is adaptive as we change the objective
function adaptively based on the feedback. At the top level, sFuzz
employs a genetic algorithm [5] which is inspired by the well-
known AFL fuzzer to evolve the test suite in order to iteratively
improve its branch coverage.
The overall workflow is shown in Algorithm 1. Variable suite
is the test suite to be generated. It is initially empty. Whenever
a test case covers a new branch, it is added into suite . Variable
seeds is a set of seed test cases, based on which new test cases are
generated. First, we generate an initial test suite using function
initPopulation(). The loop from line 3 to 6 then iteratively evolves
the test suite. In particular, we add those test cases in seeds which
cover new branches (i.e., any branch which is not covered by test
cases in suite) into suite at line 4. At line 5, we filter the test cases
in seeds through function f itToSurvive() so as to focus on those
seeds which are more likely to lead to test cases covering new
branches later. At line 6, function crossoverMuatation() generates
more test cases based on the test cases in seeds . The loop continues
until a pre-set time out is triggered. While Algorithm 1 resembles
the one in AFL, the differences are in the details of each function.
In the following, we present each function in detail.
Generating Initial Population Function initPopulation() generates
an initial population containing multiple test cases. As mentioned
above, to generate a test case, we need to generate an initial config-
uration σ0 as well as a sequence of (public) function calls with con-
crete parameters. The initial configuration by default is as follows
(in hexadecimal): b = 0, ts = 0, SA = {0xf0}, SB = {0xff00...}
and v is set using the declared initial value for each variable rep-
resenting the persistent state. sFuzz additionally allows a user to
customize the initial configuration, i.e., the user is allowed to pro-
vide an initial set of test cases.
Next, we generate multiple sequences of transactions, each of
which is a function call with concrete parameters. For a contract
with n functions, we generate n sequences. In each sequence, a
different function is called once after the constructor is called. This
makes sure that each function is tested at least once (i.e., function
coverage is 100%).
For each function call, we generate a random value for each
parameter based on its type. Note that if the parameter type has
a fixed-length, e.g., of type uint256, this is straightforward. If the
type does not have a fixed length (e.g., an array or a string), we
first randomly generate a number (with a range from 0 to bound
where bound is a bound on maximum length with a default value
of 255) representing the number of elements in the parameter (e.g.,
number of characters) and then generate a corresponding number
of element values.
Each test case is encoded in form of a bit vector. In the termi-
nology of genetic algorithms, such bit vectors can be naturally
regarded as chromosomes. The size of the bit vector equals to the
number of bits for encoding the configuration plus the number of
bits encoding the function calls. Note that for each test case, we
keep a list of function calls (which always includes the constructor
in the contract) and then encode each parameter value. If the param-
eter value is of variable-length, we use ⌈logbound⌉ (where bound
is a bound on the maximum length with a default value of 255) to
encode the length of the parameter value. For example, given the
contract shown in Figure 1, (part of) the encoding of a test case is
shown in Figure 3 where each part of encoding is labeled in the
figure. It contains 192 bytes, of which the first 96 bytes are initial
configuration and the last 96 bytes are a sequence of two function
calls and the corresponding input parameters. As there are three
string parameters, the first 3 bytes including 0x05, 0x05 and 0x05
encode the length of _response, _question and _answer respec-
tively. The remaining 0x05 values are used when there are more
than 3 dynamic variables.
Before executing the test case, the bit vector is decoded to a test
case according to our internally defined protocol. Note that the
bits in the bit vector may be correlated with each other in multiple
ways. For instance, the bits presenting the length of a variable-
length value must be equal to the ‘length’ of the value.
Fitness After executing the seeds at line 4 in Algorithm 1, function
f itToSurvive() is called to evaluate the fitness of the seeds accord-
ing to a fitness function. Note that the fitness function plays an
extremely important role.
In sFuzz, we combine two complementary strategies. One is
adopted from AFL, which works as follows. While seeds are exe-
cuted, sFuzz monitors the execution and records the branches that
each test case cover. A test case is deemed ‘fit to survive’ if it covers
a new branch in the contract, e.g., a branch which is not covered by
any test case in suite . This strategy has been shown to be effective
in many settings [7] and indeed our experimental results show that
it is effective in covering most of the branches (see Section 5).
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Figure 3: A generated test case
Although the AFL strategy allows us to quickly cover most of
the branches, it often makes very slow progress in covering the
remaining ones afterwards, i.e., often those branches which are
with strict conditions. The reason is that most likely the randomly
generated test cases would fail to satisfy the strict condition. In
such a case, the above fitness function offers little feedback and
guideline on how to generate new test cases. For instance, the
probability of satisfying the second condition at line 10 of Figure 1
is as low as 12256 (if we assume that every value is equally likely
to be generated). Intuitively, however, it is clear that a test input
withmsд.value = 200 is ‘closer’ to satisfy the condition than a test
input withmsд.value = 10000000. sFuzz thus integrates an adaptive
strategy which selects seeds based on a quantitative measure on
how far a test case is from covering any just-missed branch.
Let brn be a just-missed branch in S, i.e., an uncovered outgoing
edge from a branching node n in S and n has been covered. The
idea is to define a function distance(t ,brn ) where t is a test case to
return a quantitative measure on how far the branch brn is from
being covered by t .
Assume that brn is labeled with a condition c . Note that c can be
either true , f alse , a == b, a != b, a >= b, a > b, a <= b, or a < b
at the byte-code level where a and b are variables or constants.
In our setting, since brn is assumed to be a just-missed branch, c
must not be true (otherwise brn must be covered already). Function
distance(t ,brn ) is then defined as follows.
distance(t ,brn ) =

K if c is f alse
| a − b | + K if c is a == b
K if c is a != b
b − a + K if c is a >= b or a > b
a − b + K if c is a <= b or a < b
where K is a constant which represents the minimum distance. It
is set to be 1 in sFuzz. Intuitively, distance(t ,brn ) is defined such
that the closer the branch is from being covered, the smaller the
resultant value is.
With the above, function f itToSurvive(seeds) then selects the
seeds as shown in Algorithm 2. The loop from line 2 to 4 goes
through every test case to select those which cover a new branch.
Afterwards, for each just-missed branch brn in the smart contract,
the loop from line 5 to line 11 selects a test case from seeds which is
the closest to cover the branch according to distance(t ,brn ). Note
that one seed is selected for each just-missed branch, which makes
this algorithm a lightweight multi-objective optimization approach.
All selected seeds are then used for crossover and mutation to
Algorithm 2: Algorithm f itToSurvive(seeds)
1 let newSeeds be an empty set of test cases;
2 foreach seed in seeds do
3 if seed covers a new branch then
4 add seed into newSeeds ;
5 foreach uncovered branches brn do
6 letmin be +∞; let t be a dummy test case;
7 foreach seed in seeds do
8 if distance(t, brn ) < min then
9 letmin be dist (t, brn );
10 let t be seed ;
11 add t into newSeeds ;
12 return newSeeds ;
generate more test cases in the next step. We refer the readers to
Section 2 for an example.
Remark The above-described strategy is inspired by search-based
software testing (SBST) [16, 24] and yet it differs from SBST in
several ways. The high-level reason for the difference is that having
an AFL-based approach for fuzzing requires us to run test cases
efficiently whereas existing SBST’s seed selection strategy is time-
consuming. Furthermore, due to the stack-based implementation
of EVM, implementing existing the SBST strategy is infeasible. In
the following, we present the differences in detail.
First, existing state-of-the-art SBST techniques (i.e., the one in
EvoSuite [16]) measures how far a test case t is from covering
any uncovered branch (not only those just-missed ones) in a more
complicated way. That is, given CFG S = (N , i,E), let the distance
from a node n1 to node n2 to be the minimum number of edges
along any path from n1 to n2. Let brn be any uncovered branch and
m be a node covered by t which is the nearest node to n, i.e.,m has
a minimum distance to n compared to any other node covered by
t . SBST uses the following function to measure how far t is from
covering brn .
dist(t ,brn ) = appr_dist(t ,brn ) + norm(distance(t ,brm ))
wherebrm is an outgoing edge ofm which is along the shortest path
fromm ton. Note that ifm isn (i.e., in casebrn is just-missed),brm is
simply brn . Function appr_dist(t ,brn ) is a measurement of how far
branchbrn is from being covered by test case t , i.e., the distance from
m to n plus 1. For instance, given a control flow graph as in Figure
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4, if t covers only the edge A→ B → E, appr_dist(t ,C) = 1 since
there is one branch from B to reach C and there are two branches
from A to reach C via D. Similarly, appr_dist(t , F ) = 2. Lastly,
function norm(x) is a normalization function which normalizes the
results of distance(t ,brm ) to a value between 0 and 1. One such
function is norm(x) = 1 − 1.001−|x | [16].
Applying the above strategy in fuzzing Solidity smart contracts
is inefficient, if not infeasible, for multiple reasons. First, calculating
appr_dist(t ,brn ) would require us to construct the complete CFG.
However, constructing the CFG based on bytecode only is highly
nontrivial. In EVM, branches are realized with the opcode jumpi,
with a value representing the target program counter dynamically
at runtime. The only way to know the target is to fully simulate
the stack, which is expensive. Second, even if we have the CFG,
computing appr_dist(t ,brn ) is still expensive. Given a CFG with
K uncovered nodes. To maintain a list of ‘best’ test cases for each
uncovered node, we have to calculate appr_dist(t ,brn ) for all K
uncovered nodes, i.e., by building a table of the shortest paths
from all nodes to these K nodes. Furthermore, whenever a new
node is covered, appr_dist(t ,brn )must be updated. The overhead is
unreasonable given that efficiency is key for AFL-based fuzzing. By
focusing on just-missed branches, sFuzz avoids both problems. That
is, appr_dist(t ,brn ) is always 1 for any just-missed branchbrn since
node n must have been covered. Furthermore, because it is constant
for any uncovered branch, we can simply skip it in dist(t ,brn ) and
so that dist(t ,brn ) is reduced to distance(t ,brn ), without even the
need to normalize. This further reduces the overhead.
Another key difference between sFuzz’s strategy and existing
SBST’s is themulti-objective searching strategy. Themulti-objective
search strategies in existing SBST consider each uncovered branch
as an objective and select Pareto-optimal seeds to evolve in next
generation. Given a set of uncovered branch {b1,b2, ...,bm }, a set of
seeds {t1, t2, ..., tn }, we say ti is more Pareto-optimal than tj if ∀k ∈
0..m, distance(ti ,bk ) < distance(tj ,bk ). Otherwise, we say that ti
and tj are Pareto-equivalent. All Pareto-equivalent seeds form a
Pareto frontier and the seeds can fall into several Pareto frontiers.
Existing SBST selects the most Pareto-optimal seeds to evolve. A
known problem for such a strategy [27] is that the number of seeds
in the same Pareto frontier soars with the increase of the number
of objectives (i.e., uncovered branches). For example, there could be
hundreds of seeds in the most Pareto-optimal frontier with only 3-5
objectives, which makes it hard to select the most promising seeds
and increases the runtime overhead. In contrast, sFuzz keeps one
best seed for each just-missed branch (line 6–11 in Algorithm 2)
and as a result, the number of seeds remains small (i.e., equivalent
to the number of just-missed branches). Our experimental results
show that such a strategy balances effectiveness in identifying good
seeds and efficiency well.
3.3 Crossover and Mutation
Function crossoverMutation() generates new test cases based on
those in seeds through crossover and mutation. sFuzz adopts all of
the crossover strategies from AFL and introduces news ones spe-
cific for smart contracts. Furthermore, due to correlation between
parameters of a test case, sFuzz additionally makes sure the gener-
ated test cases are valid. For instance, sFuzz (1) randomly chooses
Figure 4: A control flow graph
Table 1: Mutations for fix-length values
Name
pruneMethodCall (new)
addMethodCall (new)
swapMethodCall (new)
singleWalkingBit, twoWalkingBit, fourWalkingBit
1/2/4 consecutive bits
singleWalkingByte, twoWalkingByte, fourWalkingByte
singleArith, twoArith, fourArith
singleInterest, twoInterest, fourInterest
overwriteWithDictionary
overwriteWithAddressDictionary
two test cases from seeds; (2) breaks the two test cases into two
pieces at a selected position; and (3) swaps the second pieces to
form two new test cases. Note that due to correlations between the
bits representing a test case, there is no guarantee that the resultant
test cases are valid and thus sFuzz always checks for validity and
discard those invalid ones.
Mutation is another way of generating new test cases. Given
a seed encoded in the form of a bit vector, sFuzz supports a set
of mutation operators to generate new test cases. All mutation
operators are shown in Table 1.
Recall that a test case is in the form of an initial configuration
and a sequence of function calls with concrete parameters. The
first three mutation operators aim to alter the sequence of function
calls, by pruning a function call, adding a function call or swapping
two function calls. When a function call is pruned (or added or
swapped), the corresponding concrete parameters are pruned (or
added or swapped) accordingly.
For those values in a test case other than those representing the
called functions, sFuzz categorizes them into two groups. The first
group contains those values which have fixed-length (e.g., a param-
eter of type uint256). sFuzz systematically applies the remaining
mutation operators shown in Table 1 to generate new values, which
are inspired by the mutation operators in AFL. Note that account
addresses (and balances) are handled slightly differently (refer to
the last row in the table) as there are special format requirements.
Each address has 32 bytes, in which the last 20 bytes contain the
address value and the first 12 bytes contain the balance of the ad-
dress. For instance, the value 0xff00...00...00f0 represent an
address 0xf0 with balance 0xff0000000000000000000000.
The second group contains those values which have variable-
length (e.g., a parameter of type array). For such values, their
lengths are encoded as part of the test case as well. We thus first mu-
tate the value representing the length in such a way that the result
is a random value between 0 and 255 where 255 is an upper bound.
If the new length is less than the current one, the corresponding
value is shortened accordingly by pruning the additional bits. If
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the length is more than the current one, random type-compatible
values are padded accordingly.
Note that we discard identical test cases generated through either
crossover or mutation. Furthermore, although we do not set a limit
on the number of mutations generated from a test case, we apply
multiple heuristics adopted from AFL to reduce the number of
mutations. For instance, if applying theWalkingByte mutation to
a block of 32 bytes does not result in any test case which covers
a new branch, in the next stages sFuzz will not mutate that block.
We refer the readers to AFL for details on these heuristics [7].
4 IMPLEMENTATION
sFuzz is implemented in C++ with an estimated 4347 lines of code.
It is publically available (https://sfuzz.github.io). It has 3 main com-
ponents: runner, libfuzzer and liboracles.
Component runner manages the execution of the test cases. sFuzz
takes as input the bytecode of a smart contract along with the ABI
(i.e., application binary interface, which can be generated automati-
cally using existing tools) of the contract. The runner then generates
a bash script file which contains a list of commands to analyze the
ABI, and set options for the other two components.
The runner sets up a test network based on which smart con-
tracts are deployed and transactions are executed. To generate
test cases for functions with address-type parameters, sFuzz de-
ploys a pool of externally owned accounts in the test network with
random balances. The pool size is less than or equal to the num-
ber of address-type parameters because it is possible to set the
same address to multiple address-type parameters. The values for
address-type parameters are then chosen randomly from this pool.
In addition, sFuzz deploys two special smart contracts as attackers,
i.e., a normal attacker and a reentrancy attacker. Each attacker is set
as the owner of the contract under test in turn. The normal attacker
throws an exception whenever other contracts call its payable fall-
back function. The reentrancy attacker calls back the function which
makes a call to its payable fallback function. If the attacker fails
to call back, it acts as a normal attacker. Note that the reentrancy
attacker is only loaded to detect Reentrancy vulnerability. Other-
wise, the normal attacker is loaded to avoid call loops of Reentrancy
Attacker which significantly reduces the speed of sFuzz.
Component libfuzzer solves the test generation problem, i.e., how
to selectively generate test cases, by implementing the fuzzing
strategy presented in the previous sections. It is responsible for
multiple tasks.
First, it constructs the CFG of the given smart contract on-the-fly.
Ideally, we would like to construct the CFG statically before fuzzing.
However, constructing the CFG based on bytecode only is highly
nontrivial. In EVM, branches are realized with the opcode jumpi,
with a value representing the target program counter dynamically
at runtime. The only way to know the target is to fully simulate
the stack, which is expensive. Therefore, sFuzz constructs the CFG
on-the-fly while fuzzing. That is, whenever the opcode jumpi is ex-
ecuted, the two destinations are recorded. If these two destinations
are not part of the CFG yet, two new nodes are created accordingly
representing the two destinations in the CFG.
Second, component libfuzzer implements the fuzzing algorithm
discussed in Section 3. One optimization is that we identify view
functions (i.e., those which do not change any variables) and ex-
clude them from test case generation. The justification is that these
view functions do not change the states and having them does not
additionaly expose those vulnerabilities sFuzz targets at (see below).
Note that view functions are marked by view, pure or constant
keywords, sFuzz reads ABI file to recognize them.
Component liboracles solves the oracle problem, i.e., it monitors the
execution of a test case and checks whether there is a vulnerability
according to an extensible library of oracles used in sFuzz. sFuzz
monitors the execution of test cases through the hooking mecha-
nism supported by EVM. Whenever EVM executes an opcode, it
creates an event containing read-only execution information, such
as the values of the stack, memory, program counter, and the cur-
rent executed opcode. sFuzz monitors these events for constructing
the CFG and computing distance(t ,brn ), as well as logs the events
for vulnerability detection. To reduce the execution overhead, vul-
nerability detection is conducted offline in batches (i.e., once for
every 500 test cases). This design allows sFuzz to easily support
different versions of Solidity, i.e., by simply replacing the EVM
packed in sFuzz.
sFuzz has an extensible architecture which allows it to easily
support different oracles as well. Currently, sFuzz supports 8 oracles
inspired by the previous work [18, 22]. Since these oracles are not
our main contribution, we refer the readers to [18, 22] for details.
These oracles are checked based on the logs of test cases. For
instance, to check if a test case expose theGasless Send vulnerability,
we check that whether test case executes a CALL instruction with
some data greater than 0when the gas is equal to 2300. The test cases
that expose vulnerabilities in the contract are kept in a separate
test suite and reported to the user together with the vulnerabilities
that they expose. Note that by design, sFuzz always reports true
positives according to our definition of vulnerability except in the
case of Freezing Ether. However, in practice, a reported vulnerability
might be a false positive as it may be what the user intended (i.e.,
our definition of vulnerability is too strict). In the case of Freezing
Ether, the identified ‘warning’ might be a false positive if there exist
some test cases which call send() or trans f er () but such test cases
are never generated. Technically, the problem of checking whether
there is Freezing Ether vulnerability can only be solved if we cover
all feasible opcode (which is often infeasible).
5 EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate sFuzz through multiple experiments.
The experiments are designed to answer the following research
questions (RQ).
• RQ1: How efficient is sFuzz?
• RQ2: Is sFuzz effective in finding smart contract vulnerabilities
and obtaining high code coverage?
• RQ3: Is the adaptive strategy useful?
Our test subjects include 4112 smart contracts which we collect
from EtherScan [4]. These contracts are implemented using Solidity
4.2.24, which is the most popular version of Solidity. Moreover,
the source code for these contracts are available, which makes
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the evaluation more accurate. We note that sFuzz can run with
bytecode only. For a baseline comparison, we compare sFuzz with
a fuzzer named ContractFuzzer reported in [15] and a symbolic
execution tool named Oyente reported in [22]. Other fuzzers for
smart contracts have been mentioned in [21]. However, we fail
to find the reported tools online or through the authors. We run
the experiments 3 times and report the average as the result. All
experimental results reported below are obtained on an Ubuntu
18.04.1 LTS machine with Intel Core i7 and 16GB of memory. We
use the default initial configuration as presented in Section 3.2.
5.1 Efficiency
To answer RQ1, we systematically apply sFuzz, ContractFuzzer and
Oyente on all 4112 smart contracts. To save time, each contract
is run for 2 minute in this experiment. Note that in general the
adaptive fuzzing strategy takes time to show its effectiveness (as we
will show later) and thus this setting gives an edge to other tools.
We measure the efficiency of sFuzz by counting how many test
cases are generated and executed per second. Naturally, a test case
for a more complicated contract (e.g., with many loop iterations)
takes more time to execute. Thus, we show how efficiency varies
for different contracts. Figure 5 summarizes the result, where each
bar represents 10% (about 400) of the fuzzed contracts and the
y-axis shows the number of test cases generated and executed
per second. The contracts are sorted according to how efficiently
it can be fuzzed. From the figure, we observe that the efficiency
varies significantly over different contracts, i.e., sFuzz generates
and executes more than 989 test cases per second on average for the
top 10% of the contracts, and less than 14 test cases for the bottom
20%. On average, sFuzz generates and executes more than 208 test
cases per second.
Figure 5 also compares the efficiency of sFuzz with Oyente and
ContractFuzzer. From the results, we observe that sFuzz is signifi-
cantly more efficient than other tools. On average, ContractFuzzer
and Oyente generate and execute 0.1 and 16 test cases per second
respectively. There are multiple reasons why sFuzz is much faster.
First, ContractFuzzer simulates the whole network and manages
the blockchain (e.g., commit state changes to storage and append
newmined blocks to blockchain after function calls), whereas sFuzz
simulates only details of network or blockchain which are relevant
to vulnerabilities in smart contracts. Second, sFuzz has a highly
optimized implementation in C++, whereas ContractFuzzer is based
on Node.js and Go language. In the case of Oyente, because it is a
symbolic execution tool, Oyente is expected to run slower than a
fuzzer like sFuzz.
We further conduct an experiment to measure the overhead of
monitoring the execution of a test case (using the hooking mecha-
nism) and the overall overhead of the fuzzing process (including
the overall of monitoring the execution, constructing the CFG, mu-
tating the test cases and comparing them, etc.). We apply sFuzz to
a set of 60 randomly selected contracts and measure the time spent
on executing the test cases, monitoring the execution and other
steps of the fuzzing process. The results show that on average the
monitoring consumes about 10% of the total execution time and
the overhead of the fuzzing process (including monitoring) is about
Figure 5: Efficiency comparison between sFuzz, Oyente, and
ContractFuzzer
Figure 6: Coverage comparison between sFuzz and Contract-
Fuzzer
Figure 7: Coverage comparison between sFuzz and Oyente
14%. This is very efficient compared to the reported overhead in
other fuzzers [32].
5.2 Effectiveness
To answer RQ2, we aim to measure the branch coverage achieved by
the test suite generated for each smart contract, as well as count the
number of vulnerabilities identified. However, measuring branch
coverage precisely is highly non-trivial due to, for instance, the
problem of infeasible branches. Thus, we instead measure the num-
ber of distinct branches covered by the generated test suite. Figure 6
summarizes a comparison between sFuzz and ContractFuzzer in
terms of the number of distinct branches covered. The y-axis is the
number of branches covered by sFuzz minus that of ContractFuzzer
and each point on the x-axis represents a smart contract. The con-
tracts are sorted by their y-axis value. Similarly, Figure 7 shows the
comparison between sFuzz and Oyente.
For most of the smart contracts (i.e., 4077 of 4112 contracts)
sFuzz covers more branches than ContractFuzzer. To our surprise,
ContractFuzzer managed to cover more branches for 35 contracts.
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1 contract A {
2 mapping(address => uint) balances;
3 uint id = 10;
4 function main(uint x, uint y) {
5 if (id == 9) {
6 if (balances[msg.sender] > 10) {
7 uint sum = x + y; } } } }
Figure 8: Oyente visits infeasible branches
A closer investigation shows that the number of branches covered
by ContractFuzzer is inflated for the following reasons. First, as
sFuzz does not execute view functions (for efficiency reasons), all
branches in these functions are not counted. Because view functions
do not modify the state of a smart contract, they are considered
irrelevant to vulnerabilities. Second, ContractFuzzer sometimes
generates invalid test cases which fail mandatory constraints and
cover additional branches. Mandatory constraints are generated by
the compiler (i.e., the Solidity compiler) and are embedded in the
bytecode to assert the correctness logic of function calls or data
types. For example, ContractFuzzer invokes a fallback function of
a non-fallback contract or sends Ethereum to functions which are
not marked with the payable keyword. As a result, the mandatory
constraints are failed which lead to branches which signal an error
in the test case being covered.
In the case of Oyente, in 3402 contracts, Oyente covers more
branches than sFuzz. An investigation shows that Oyente analyzes
every function separately and thus has to assume that state vari-
ables can take arbitrary values (without considering their initial
values or constraints on how the values are updated). As a result,
Oyente can easily satisfy almost all conditions in smart contracts.
Given the sample contract A in Figure 8, Oyente covers 99.1% EVM
code and discovers an integer overflow vulnerability. It means that
these conditions: id == 9 and balances[msд.sender ] > 10 are satis-
fied. However, it is impossible as there is no way to change values
of id and balances[msд.sender ]. Often, a condition in smart con-
tract is the comparison between local/parameter variables and state
variables, e.g., balances[msд.sender ] > value (whether sender has
enough Ethereum to deduce). In such cases, sFuzz must call the
function which sets certain values to the state variables before sat-
isfying them whereas Oyente assigns arbitrary values directly to
state variables. It is apparent to us that Oyente’s approach is flawed
and would ‘cover’ many infeasible paths.
In the following, we summarize the number of vulnerable con-
tracts discovered by sFuzz in each category. The results are shown
in Table 2. The first column shows the type of vulnerability. The
next three columns show the number of vulnerable contracts found
by sFuzz, ContractFuzzer and Oyente respectively. The sub-column
# show the number of contracts that have the vulnerability accord-
ing to each vulnerability type and the second sub-column is the
percentage of true positives of the identified vulnerabilities. For all
categories, sFuzz finds more vulnerable contracts than Contract-
Fuzzer. Note that ContractFuzzer removes Freezing Ether from their
source code and does not check Integer Overflow/Underflow. In total,
sFuzz finds vulnerabilities in 1113 contracts, i.e., 24 times more than
that of ContractFuzzer.
Table 2: Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Type sFuzz ContractFuzzer Oyente# true posi. # true posi. # true posi.
Gasless Send 764 100% 14 100% 0 N.A.
Exception Disorder 36 100% 6 100% 0 N.A.
Reentrancy 29 100% 3 100% 52 60%
Timestamp Dependency 243 86% 28 86% 102 100%
Block Number Dependency 59 80% 16 95% 0 N.A.
Dangerous DelegateCall 17 100% 0 100% 0 N.A.
Integer Overflow 98 100% 0 N.A. 3350 60%
Integer Underflow 224 80% 0 N.A. 2246 60%
Freezing Ether 15 60% 0 N.A. 0 N.A.
To evaluate the soundness of sFuzz, we manually examine the
identified vulnerable contracts to check whether they are true posi-
tives or not. However, we are unable to manually check all the iden-
tified vulnerability for two reasons. First, there is an overwhelming
number of vulnerabilities. Instead, we randomly sample 50 vulner-
able contracts with source code in each category and manually
check whether the identified vulnerability is a true positive or not.
If there are fewer than 50 vulnerable contracts with source code in
the category, we check all of them.
ForGasless Send, Exception Disorder and Reentrancy vulnerability,
all 50 sampled vulnerable contracts are true positives. For Time-
stamp Dependency, out of the 50 sampled vulnerable contracts, 43
of them are true positives. In the remaining 7 contracts, although
block.timestamp and/or now is used in a condition, they are irrele-
vant to the Ether sending part (i.e., no control/data dependency).
Rather their values are saved in global variables to record the cre-
ation time of specific events. sFuzz mistakenly claims that such
cases are vulnerable. For Block Number Dependency, 40 out of the
50 sampled vulnerable contracts are true positives. Similarly, the
reason for the 10 false positives is the value of block.number is
assigned to global variables but they are irrelevant to Ether sending
process. For Dangerous DelegateCall, all 17 sampled contracts are
indeed vulnerable. Similarly so for Integer Overflow. For Integer
Underflow, 40 of the 50 identified contracts are indeed vulnerable.
The reason for the 10 false positives is because it is non-trivial
to identify the correct type of a variable based on bytecode only
(e.g., whether it is uint256 or uint128), sFuzz conservatively assumes
that all arithmetic operations returning a negative value may be
vulnerable. This can be improved by adopting the approach in [29]
to infer types based on EVM bytecode. Lastly, for Freezing Ether,
9 of the 15 identified contracts are true positives. The reason for
the 6 false positives is that although there is a program path which
allows the contract to send Ether, the program path is not covered
and sFuzz falsely assumes that there is no such program path. This
percentage of such false positives is expected to be reduced if sFuzz
is applied for a longer time (with more branches covered).
The last column in Table 2 shows the results of Oyente. The
results should be taken with a grain of salt since Oyente requires
the source code. For instance, it is trivial to know the type of vari-
ables with the source code, and thus Oyente identifies many more
problems with Integer Overflow/Underflow. For the remaining vul-
nerabilities, Oyente does not support 5 of them; identifies a higher
number of vulnerable contracts for Reentrancy but with a higher
false positive rate; and identifies much fewer vulnerable contracts
for Timestamp Dependency.
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Figure 9: Percentage of test cases due to adaptive strategy
Figure 10: Effective of adaptive strategy over time
5.3 Adaptiveness
To answer RQ3, we systematically analyze the test suite generated
by sFuzz for each smart contract. Note that each test case covers at
least one branch which is not covered by any other test cases. To
measure how the two fuzzing strategies implemented in sFuzz com-
plement each other, we count how many test cases in the resultant
test suites are generated due to the AFL strategy and how many
are due to the adaptive strategy. Note that a test case is judged to
be due to the adaptive strategy if and only if it is generated based
on a seed selected by line 11 at Algorithm 2.
The results are shown in Figure 9, where the y-axis is the per-
centage of test cases generated by the strategy. Each bar represents
10% of the contracts. We remark that the two strategies have dif-
ferent targets and thus whether they are effective largely depends
on what branching conditions are in the smart contracts. We thus
sort the contracts according to the speed of sFuzz. The bar on the
rightmost thus represents the top 10% contracts. We observe that,
as expected, the AFL strategy easily covers most of the branches
(since the conditions for executing most branches are not strict).
For about 80% of the smart contracts, the adaptive strategy makes a
noticeable contribution, i.e., contributing an average of 31% of the
generated test cases. Given that sFuzz is applied for each contract
only for 2 minutes, the result is encouraging as we hypothesize that
the effect of the adaptive strategy would be more apparent if sFuzz
is applied for a longer period of time.
To test our hypothesis, we record the percentage of test cases
generated by the adaptive strategy every 12 seconds. The results
are shown in Figure 10, where the x-axis is the fuzzing time and
each bar shows the percentage after certain number of seconds. We
can observe that the percentage of generated test cases by adaptive
strategy increases with more fuzzing time. On average, the percent-
age rises from 18% after 12 seconds fuzzing to 33% after 2 minutes
fuzzing. From the results, we conclude the adaptive strategy is use-
ful in increasing the coverage of the generated test suites.
Threat to validity There are both internal threats and external
threats to our work. For external threats, it is probable that sFuzz’s
performance will vary with the choice of the initial population, as
other researchers have noted [20]. For internal threats, the percent-
age of true positives in Table 2 may not be accurate as they are
approximated by a sample of 50 contracts for each type of vulnera-
bility. In addition, the exact intention of the author of the contract
is not always clear, even if we try our best to read the source code.
6 RELATEDWORK AND CONCLUSION
sFuzz is closely related to existing fuzzers for smart contracts. Con-
tractFuzzer [18] is a fuzzer which can check 7 different types of
vulnerabilities. Its approach, however, does not use any feedback to
improve the test suite. Echidna [3] is another fuzzer that is report-
edly capable of checking if the contract violates some user-defined
properties. However, we fail to find any publication about it.
sFuzz is complementary to existing symbolic execution engines
for smart contracts. In [22], Luu et al. presented an engine to find
potential security bugs in smart contracts. The tool, however, is
neither sound nor complete. In [21], Krupp and Rossow presented
teEther, which is focused on financial transactions and related
vulnerabilities. In [25], Nikolic et al. presented a tool namedMAIAN,
which can find 3 types of trace vulnerabilities. In [29], Torres et al.
presented Osiris, a tool which combines symbolic execution and
taint analysis to discover 3 types of integer bugs in smart contracts.
Different from the above works, sFuzz is a fuzzer and it can be
combined with the above engines to form a hybrid fuzzing engine.
sFuzz is related to work on formal verification of smart contracts.
Zeus [19] is a framework which verifies the correctness and fair-
ness of smart contracts based on LLVM. Bhargavan et al. proposed
a framework to verify smart contracts formally by transforming
the source code and the bytecode to F*, a language designed for
verification [9]. In [17], the author presented an attempt to verify
the Deed contract using Isabelle/HOL [26].
sFuzz is broadly related to work on analyzing smart contracts.
In [13], Delmolino et al. showed that writing a safe smart contract
is not a trivial task. In [8], Atzei et al. provided a taxonomy for
common vulnerabilities in smart contracts with real-world attacks.
In [14], the authors performed a call graph analysis and showed that
only 40% of smart contracts are truthless as their control flows are
immutable. In [10], Chen et al. presented 7 gas-cost programming
patterns and showed that most of the contracts suffer from these
gas-cost patterns.
To conclude, in this work, we present sFuzz, an adaptive fuzzing
engine for EVM smart contracts. Experimental results show that
sFuzz is significantly more reliable, faster, and more effective than
existing fuzzers. sFuzz is currently under rapid development and
has already gained interest from multiple companies and research
organizations.
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